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BLD-304        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1478 
___________ 
 
ROBIN NEIL SNYDER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED  
STATES OF AMERICA; OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-cv-00432) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 20, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 25, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robin Snyder, a federal prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
petition.  We will affirm. 
 In 2008, Snyder received a 97-month sentence for wire fraud, money laundering, 
and obstruction of justice.  In his § 2241 petition, Snyder sought credit for 389 days of 
alleged pretrial detention.  This period was comprised of Snyder’s day of arrest and a 
subsequent period of 388 days of pretrial home detention.1  Snyder relied largely on 18 
U.S.C. § 3585(b), which generally entitles defendants to credit for time spent in “official 
detention” prior to the commencement of their sentences.  The District Court dismissed 
with prejudice Snyder’s claim regarding his 388 days of home confinement, finding it 
“facially meritless.”  Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4-5.  The Court dismissed 
Snyder’s claim regarding his arrest day without prejudice for failing to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with the federal Bureau of Prisons.  Id.  It concluded that 
Snyder’s sending of three demand letters to United States Attorney General did not 
qualify as exhaustion.  Id. at 4.  We agree with the District Court’s resolution of Snyder’s 
claims. 
 “A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment 
for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence 
                                              
1 In a document filed in this Court, Snyder alleges he spent nine days in a local jail and 
379 days in home detention.  As Snyder did not present this claim to the District Court, 
we will not address it. 
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commences….”  18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  The Supreme Court has held “a defendant suffers 
‘detention’ only when committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant 
admitted to bail on restrictive conditions… is ‘released.’”  Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 
57 (1995).  In Koray, the defendant was required to be confined in a community 
treatment center as a condition of bail.  Id. at 53.  The Supreme Court held this 
confinement could not be credited for time served because “credit for time spent in 
‘official detention’ under § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were 
detained in a ‘penal or correctional facility….’”  Id. at 58.   
 In this case, Snyder was confined at home, not in any penal or correctional facility.  
Although he was subject to restrictions, he was not subject to official detention during his 
period of home confinement.  Therefore, his time spent in home detention as a condition 
of bail cannot be credited as time served. 
 Snyder also seeks credit for the day of his arrest.  We agree with the District Court 
that Snyder has not exhausted administrative remedies as to the claim.  See Moscato v. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  He must do so before raising 
this claim in federal court.   
 For the reasons above, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 
 
 
